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Abstract 
 
This paper presents some stylized features of the financial integration of the four basin regions 
(Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Caspian Sea and Mediterranean Sea regions) and discusses the 
developments, trends and features of the IIP in the regions. Chapter 3 identifies the gaps in them, 
distinguishing the EU e non-EU members and provides an overview of the asymmetries and the 
convergence as a result of the financial integration in the different markets. After the review the 
trends the final chapter points to areas where further efforts are needed for achieving greater 
regional integration. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1990s the European Union undertook a series of reforms in order to complete the full 
liberalization of capital transactions among the member states and with third parties. The aim was to 
realize the full financial integration of the European capital markets along the same principles of the 
common market for good and services2. In 2004, the Wider Europe and the ENP projects proposed 
a “comprehensive prudential regulatory framework for the financial services area”3, that would 
reinforce the undergoing benefits of the capital account liberalization in the partner countries. 
In combination with the completion of the internal market and the implementation of the EMU, the 
original conceptual framework suggests, that over time, more financial integration will promote the 
stability of financial markets and help enhance the overall economic performance with financial 
innovations and organisational improvements. 
One of the main benefits of financial integration is the development of the financial sector, allowing 
domestic financial markets to become deeper and more sophisticated. Thus, banks and financial 
institutions may increase the financial alternatives for borrowers and investors4.  
                                                            
2 European Commission (1996). 
3 European Commission (2004), pp. 15-16. “It will be key to the creation of business and the 
promotion of investments that these countries ensure that companies are able to operate on a level 
playing field. In combination with the above measures, access to European financial markets 
should, over time, add to the stability of partners’ financial markets and help enhance their overall 
economic performance. The further liberalising of capital movements will provide new 
opportunities.” 
4 For a critical analysis of the benefits of capital liberalisation see STIGLITZ (2004), in particular 
the different impact between FDI and short-term capital flows. 
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This paper takes a comparative look at the patterns of international financial integration and 
addresses the thematic issues with the aim to benchmark the four basin regions. It is well known 
that they represent four groups of countries with different institutional and economic characteristics. 
In particular the regions are the following: 
The Baltic Sea region: EU: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Germany, 
Poland; Non EU: Russia, Belarus 
The Black Sea region: EU. Bulgaria, Greece, Romania; Non EU: Turkey, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, 
Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan 
The Caspian Sea region: EU: none; Non EU: Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 
Georgia, Armenia, Turkey, Uzbekistan 
The Mediterranean Sea region: EU: France, Greece, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, Malta, Cyprus; Non EU: 
Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Albania, Serbia, Macedonia. 
There are some overlapping among the groups: Russia and Turkey have borders in three basins, 
while Azerbaijan and Greece are in two basins. 
 
2. Two questions 
The first question is related to the theoretical models of financial integration.  
The standard economic theory suggests that liberalisation of capital flows, in particular long-term 
capital flows, and financial development are important policy instruments, because they provide a 
favourable support for the integration of neighbouring countries on a regional scale. In this regard, 
capital flows play a crucial role, in terms of fostering accelerated growth, technical innovation and 
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enterprise restructuring5. In recognition of these potential benefits, governments of these countries 
have undertaken widespread capital account liberalization over the past quarter-century.  
In the 1990s, capital account liberalization was an important part of the market reforms introduced 
by governments in the transition economies6. Because of the capital account liberalization, these 
countries attracted large amounts of foreign capital and the main benefit was the development of 
their financial system, which involves more complete, deeper, better-regulated financial markets 
and more credit to foster the transition and the economic growth. 
There are two main channels through which financial integration promotes financial development. 
First, financial integration implies that a new type of capital and more capital is available to 
neighbouring countries. Among other things, new and more capital allows these countries to better 
smooth consumption, deepens financial markets, and increases the degree of market discipline.  
Second, financial integration leads to a better financial infrastructure, which mitigates information 
asymmetries and, as a consequence, reduces problems such as adverse selection and moral hazard7. 
The second question is addressed to the empirical measurement of the financial integration and it 
call for quantitative analysis for accessing how open are the capital markets of these countries and 
how is progressing the financial integration among the basins. 
The definition of “financial integration” consider two broad categories of indicators: Quantity or 
volume-based indicators are used to investigate the extent to which investors have internationalised 
                                                            
5 See PRASAD, 2003 and EDISON, 2004. 
6 Capital account liberalization is considered an important precursor to financial integration. See 
KOSE et al. 2009. 
7 See SCHMUKLER, 2004 and the criticism of STIGLITZ, 2004. See also MASSAD, 2000. 
  5
their portfolios. In financially integrated markets investors will increase their holdings of non-
domestic assets in order to benefits from the international diversification. 
Instead, price-based indicators measure discrepancies in asset prices on the basis of their 
geographic origin. In a perfectly integrated market, prices of assets with similar characteristics 
should be the same or at least largely influenced by common area factors.  
In this paper we approach the comparison using volume-based indicators. 
 
3. Financial integration in the four basins 
3.1 The evidence and the practices 
Liberalization of capital flows is a general feature in almost all countries of the four basins, but the 
degree of openness and its timing has been the subject of specific policy decisions. Most 
neighbouring countries undertook a series of market reforms and adjusted their monetary policies to 
allow for a higher openness of the capital account openness over the decade. Only 7 countries 
decided to lift all capital controls according to the acquis communitaire and became full members of 
the EU. 
While the integration policies of the European Union (EU) had the explicit aim of removing legal 
barriers on capital cross-border transactions8 and promoting the financial integration in the single 
currency area, the non EU partners adopted a broad variety of different exchange rate regimes and 
capital liberalisation policies. 
Only four partner countries opted for pegging the euro with currency boards arrangements 
(Bulgaria, Bosnia) or conventional fixed peg arrangements (Macedonia, Croatia). The large 
                                                            
8 The EU Banking Directives (1977, 1988), the Financial Services Action Plan (1999), the White 
Paper (2005). 
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majority of partners opted for a fixed peg arrangements anchored to the US dollar (Belarus, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Morocco, Russia, Tunisia, Turkmenistan) or to the SDR as Libya. Other 
countries decided to pursue a more flexible approach and introduced a crawling peg system with a 
composite basket of currencies as Iran or a managed float system as Turkey, Ukraine, Algeria, 
Egypt, Moldova and Romania. 
Capital account liberalisation was also mixed, with the Baltic states proceeding towards the 
accession to the EU and the Caspian and Mediterranean countries lagging behind.  
In order to obtain a comparable measure of capital account restrictions of the 17 EU members and 
29 non EU countries we use the annual data from the IMF’s Annual Reports on Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER)9, as suggested by the majority of studies on 
capital account liberalization. These data, from an institutional point of view, or a de jure measure, 
have several advantages: they provide a consistent measure of restrictions on capital account 
transactions as well as foreign exchange arrangements; they are available on an annual basis across 
a wide range of countries. Their major disadvantage is that such “rule based” data generate a simple 
“on-off” indicator, which doesn’t not tell us the relative degree of capital restrictions (or capital 
mobility) or how legal restrictions are enforced. 
However, the recent empirical research tried to overcome these shortcomings. For example, Chinn 
and Ito10 proposed a composite index (KAOPEN) which incorporates information not only on 
restrictions on capital account transactions, but also on current account transactions and exchange 
rate arrangements. The index takes positive values when the level of restrictions is low and negative 
values when the countries have a higher intensity of capital controls. 
                                                            
9 Among others, de-jure measures based on information on the AREAER have been developed by 
QUINN 1997, JOHNSTON and TAMIRISA 1998, MINIANE 2004, CHINN and ITO 2002, 2008. 
10 CHINN and ITO 2002. 
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Figure 1: Capital Account Openess (KAOPEN) and Foreign Exchange Regime 
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The analysis presented in table 1 shows that countries which adopted the Euro or pegged their 
currencies to Euro during the period of observation from year 2000 to year 2007 had the best 
growth of financial integration (Kaopen index higher than 1,50). Instead those counties that pegged 
their currencies to US dollar or SDR or other composite baskets (in particular the Black Sea and the 
Caspian Sea regions) had the lowest growth of financial integration, with negative Kaopen indices. 
Not surprisingly, countries with pegged their rates to the EU had considerably higher financial 
integration, confirming the conventional discipline. When the national rules converge to EU norms, 
regional financial integration improve substantially with greater participation of domestic banks and 
private investors. 
These are, of course, simple observations. It is, however, possible to suggest how much financial 
integrations was in fact due to the introduction of euro (the highest level) or the pegging to euro. In 
particular the Baltic Sea region shows the best experience, not only for the large concentration of 
EU members, but also for the “Russian factor” which has been supported by the institutional 
liberalization of the capital accounts in the most recent years and the consequent convergence 
shown in figure 2. Also in the Mediterranean countries, as capital controls have been progressively 
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eased in recent years, the financial integration has increased significantly with positive values of the 
endex11.  
The history of the European Union and of some individual countries has recognized the importance 
of financial cooperation, which has been institutionalized in three regions: the EIB, FEMIP for the 
Mediterranean (the oldest and the largest), the Nordic Investment Bank (with the extension to the 
three accession countries in 2005), the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (the smallest). Only 
the Caspian Region has not yet received due attention. The level of regional cooperation has 
increased over time, adding new projects on the portfolio and increasing the resources to the 
planned needs. 
However, the financial resources are limited and the total asset exposure is only a small fraction of 
the total capital flows in the regions. Consequently, over time the resources have been properly 
addressed on projects of mutual interest, from energy, to transport, to environment, to SMEs, 
keeping a marginal role, while capital liberalization, combined with market deregulation, was 
creating opportunities in term of economic growth and employment. The result is that the savings of 
the EU economies had the possibility to finance investments in the neighbouring partners, to 
differentiate the risk and attain a more efficient allocation of capital. However, capital outflows 
have also less desirable side-effects. In a context of incomplete structural reforms, as in the 
Mediterranean and Caspian Sea regions, the international capital flows carry considerable risks 
which could magnify the underlying macroeconomic and structural weaknesses. 
In brief, the empirical evidence shows that capital flows are influenced by many factors, some of 
them general, other more country specific: liberalisation of international capital transactions; 
regulatory reforms of capital markets; improvements in the macroeconomic performance of 
                                                            
11 MÜLLER-JENTSCH 2004; LAGOARDE-SEGOT and LUCEY 2008. 
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countries; rapid progress in communication technologies, and privatisation and structural economic 
policies in countries.  
 
3.2 The domestic perspective 
Financial market integration plays a special role in neighbouring countries which are all transition 
or emerging countries. It is widely known that the financial market is one of the most important 
elements of the transition, as it is the central institution for transforming savings into investments 
and thus generating long-term economic growth. 
Previous studies have shown that the financial integration can be analysed from two different 
perspectives. 
From the domestic perspective, financial markets in neighbouring countries still remain 
underdeveloped and rudimentary, which is clearly shown in Table 1. 
The Baltic Sea basin has the highest average level of GNI per capita compared with the other 
regions, followed by the Mediterranean Sea basin. The difference between EU and Non EU member 
states, measured by the standard deviation, is also lower in the Baltic Sea basin then in the 
Mediterranean, with the highest differences in the Black Sea basin. 
The ranking remains essentially the same if we look at the two other indicators of financial 
development: the Market capitalisation of the listed companies and the Share of lending to private 
sector.  
The indicators show two different aspects of the financial divide between EU and non-EU 
members, and between regions. Where the process of financial liberalization is more advanced, as 
for the stock exchange, the gap is much smaller. But where national restrictions prevail on the 
harmonization to international rules, as in the commercial banking system, the gap is much wider 
and more resistant over the decade. 
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The share of private claims on GDP can help to access the degree of financial liberalization and 
financial deepening. Table 1 indicates that the gap in financial deepening has been reduced during 
the decade, but it still remains considerably high, one third in average of the euro area. Also the 
differences among the countries or region are important: a low 20-35% in the Caspian and Baltic 
region, with the predominant presence of Russia, compared to a 50% in the Mediterranean region 
which has a relatively well developed commercial banking system.  
Instead, for the market capitalization index, the differences disappeared during the decade as a 
result of the improvements of the corporate governance of the listed companies and the government 
policies. Financial activities have been boosted by increased listings of companies, mostly made 
possible through privatization of state-owned enterprises. In addition, the growth of their economies 
has been well above that of the EU, and the attractiveness of these new stock markets has grown 
considerably in size and volume. For example, the Egyptian equity market is one of the most 
developed in the Mediterranean region with 306 listed companies in 2009 (down from 1148 in 
2002), a respectable number comparable to the listed companies in the Stock exchanges of Turkey 
and Russia, 315 and 333 respectively. The cumulative result is that the average capitalization index 
in the four regions increased to 50-60% in 2007 from 10-15% in the nineties, compared to the high 
80% of the Eurozone. Therefore, considering the good performance of these markets, some of these 
countries have been included in the MSCI composite index12. According to the classification of 
markets and the accessibility measures that reflect the international investors’ experience and 
                                                            
12 MSCI, 2010 
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excluding the Eurozone countries, 12 countries are defined as frontier markets13; other four as 
emerging countries, and one, Israel, as developed market. 
In this context of large differences in volume and in scale, the international financial integration has 
provided additional resource to supplement domestic savings and increased the competition in 
domestic financial systems. On the way to adapt their rules and regulations to the new environment, 
these countries faced several problems that concern not only the development of a national financial 
intermediation system but the economy in general.  
Some of these problems have an institutional nature, as the low profitability of the economy and its 
industries, the lack of a common corporate and economic culture or the inadequate protection of the 
minority shareholder rights during the privatisation phase. And on more than one occasion, the 
monopolisation of some sectors of the economy had a significant and negative influence in the 
financial markets. 
 
Table 1: Domestic financial integration 
  GNI per capita PPP Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) 
Domestic credit to 
private sector (% of 
GDP) 
  2000 2009 2000 2007 2008 2000 2008 
EU Baltic 16.790 27.051 72,6 69,0 27,0 55,6 105,2 
Non EU Baltic 5.615 13.790 7,5 58,0 39,4 11,1 34,9 
         
EU Black Sea 9.357 17.683 32,0 55,5 17,7 22,2 68,8 
Non EU Black Sea 3.510 8.337 11,2 36,2 16,0 11,4 35,9 
         
EU Caspian Sea 0 0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Non EU Caspian Sea 3.758 8.582 6,3 25,6 13,6 10,9 21,2 
         
EU Mediterranean Sea 19.297 27.990 66,6 91,7 30,4 94,3 138,5 
                                                            
13 Frontier markets: Estonia, Lituania; Kazakhstan; Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine; Croatia, Lebanon, 
Jordan; Serbia, Slovenia, Tunisia. Emerging markets: Russia, Turkey, Egypt, Morocco; Developed 
markets: Israel and the Eurozone countries. 
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Non EU Mediterranean Sea 5.524 11.144 12,3 53,9 27,7 35,9 48,9 
         
Euro Area 23.275 33.193 86,9 85,0 37,9 97,9 126,4 
 
 
3.3 The international perspective 
From an international perspective the main contribution of integration is the source of financing, 
with the traditional tripartition of international capital flows: (1) Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
which are flows between firms and their foreign subsidiaries or foreign partners and may be the 
result of earnings of the same foreign subsidiary that are retained abroad; (2) Portfolio investments, 
which are private transaction in equity securities and debt securities between banks and financial 
intermediaries; (3) Debt instruments, which are financial flows between financial intermediaries and 
firms and governments which supports trade and investment activities.  
All indicators of cross-border transactions from the IMF of the BIS suggest an ever increasing 
interdependence within the countries of the four basins and the EU. 
For the analysis we use the database of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2000-2007)14 with the update for 
the year 2008. According to the authors’ methodology, international financial transactions are 
divided into broad categories: portfolio equity investment, FDI, foreign exchange reserves, and debt 
(which includes portfolio debt securities as well as other instruments, such as loans, deposits, and 
trade credits).  
The analysis will consider stocks, which is typical for such kind of structural analysis, instead of 
flows. The net external position, given by the difference between total external assets and total 
external liabilities, measures the net creditor or debtor position of the four regions vis-à-vis the rest 
of the world. Therefore, the net external position is similar to the IMF definition of “Net 
International Investment Position”, which is the measure of the cross-border financial net flows 
                                                            
14 The database is available on line at http://www.philiplane.org/EWN.html 
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(over time) plus the changes in the value of the holdings of these assets. We used the Lane Milesi-
Ferretti database because the IIP statistics diffused by the IMF do not yet cover all neighbouring 
countries of the four basins. 
From the elaboration of data we can derive a number of broad trends or stylized facts. 
 
3.4 Two big trends 
The pattern of international financial integration have changed significantly over the decade. It 
seems that the direction of capital flows is no longer a one-way, top-down element of the European 
pyramid of external relations. There are some partner countries with the highest assets close to the 
highest liabilities, resulting in almost flat net position and others with increasing unbalances, 
positive or negative. The traditional characterization of capital-rich and capital-poor no longer 
follows the EU's external borders, so as to emphasize the traditional separation between the North 
and the South that has governed the debate in the seventies. Today the role of financial 
intermediation will hold for both: not only supplementing the domestic savings as proposed by the 
traditional European institutional literature, but mobilizing the accumulated financial resources in 
some countries or “swapping” assets and liabilities in order to diversify the risk. 
In presenting the data, we divide countries into four basins. In addition in order to identify the EU 
members within each group, we subdivide the 4 Seas groups in EU e non EU. The separation is 
necessary in order to remark the different institutional character of the country and its association 
with the foreign exchange regime. 
The indicators follow the definition proposed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003)15 for measuring 
the International Financial Integration as a stock to GDP ratio: 
                                                            
15 LANE and MILESI-FERRETTI 2001; LANE and MILESI-FERRETTI 2003. 
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(1) IFI = (FA + FL) / GDP 
where FA (FL) denotes the stock of external assets (liabilities). This ratio is a volume-based 
measure of international financial integration.  
The indicator can also be expressed as a difference between gross foreign assets and foreign, as 
defined by the net external position, and GDP.  
(2) NEP = (FA - FL) / GDP 
 
Figure 2 plots the IFI ratio, as a weighted average, for each of the four groups of countries over the 
period 2000-2008. Since most of the adjustment of the liberalization of the capital accounts were 
implemented rather quickly in the nineties, the share of capital flows has finally stabilized at a ratio 
between 1,0 and 1,5, while continuing to increase in the euro area. 
For the non-EU economies, we notice a deceleration of the financial integration that stops in 2004 
with a resumption of bilateral flows that led these countries to overcome the initial levels of 
integration. The financial crisis of 2008 has dissolved the progress achieved in a decade. The 
development is however not comparable to the strength and the speed of financial integration within 
the Union, with a ratio three time higher than the GDP.  
This is, of course, consistent with the theory of financial harmonisation pursued by the Union since 
the end of the seventies: no doubts that the international financial integration has increased 
markedly, particularly among the EU economies. While the trend towards increased international 
asset trade has been visible since the early 1970s, it has accelerated in the mid-1990s with the 
implementation of the three stages of the EMU (Economic Monetary Union). Total assets of the 
Euro Area increased from 6.590 billion USD to 19.239 billions in 2008. The IFI ratio increased 
from 210 to 300% of GDP. In the EU, the increase in cross-border asset holdings has been strong 
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for both debt and equity instruments (the latter including FDI and portfolio equity) and in other debt 
instruments. 
The situation is completely different in the non-EU countries. We observe a general increase in 
cross-border equity holdings, particularly FDI, but the overall stock of debt instruments on GDP 
(debt assets and debt liabilities) has decreased over the decade. The pattern are similar for the four 
basins, while we notice important differences in term of intensity. The non EU Baltic economies 
have the highest IFI index for FDI and Portfolio equity instruments, 90% of GDP in 2007, while the 
lowest 50% is reported by non EU Mediterranean countries. Furthermore, all four Neighbouring 
regions show a common trend towards a smaller share of debt instruments, which is also converging 
to 50% of GDP.  
 
Figure 2: International Integration Index (Gross position) 
a) Gross capital flows 
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b) Gross Portfolio Equity and Foreign Direct Investment 
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c) Gross Other Investment (Portfolio Securities Debt and Other Investment) 
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Clearly, factors such as the increase in trade linkages, the reduction in capital controls, the foreign 
exchange regime, advances in telecommunications, and the increased availability of information are 
important in driving the acceleration of international financial integration in the four regions, but 
the trends (in particular those referring to other investments) underscore the deep difference that 
separates the European economy and that of neighbouring countries. 
However, the structure and the quality of capital stocks has improved, in the sense that FDI has 
become the most dynamic source of net capital flows in all regions. The “Russian factor” is relevant 
here. In fact, the non-EU Baltic countries double their advantage on the Mediterranean region, 
while considering the relative size to GDP, and they are also more integrated than the EU Black Sea 
countries. During the decade FDI seems the most desirable type of flows, in that it tends to be more 
long-term and less easily reversible, as well as often incorporating new technology and other know-
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how. Additionally we can notice that the announcement of the ENP project in 2004 has contributed 
positively in accelerating the FDI inflows in all regions. 
But there is another fundamental trend concerning the convergence effect of a deeper integration. 
The EU imbalances have increased during the decade after the accession of the Eastern and Nordi 
countries, while for the non EU partners the convergence was the main effect of the European 
integration project until the disruption caused by the financial crisis in 2008. The Euro Area 
consolidated its position of net exporter of capital, with a net negative position near to 20% of GDP. 
Non EU Mediterranean decreased their net debt position from 35% to 21% of GDP, while the non 
EU Baltic region (Russia, for clarity) shifted from a net positive position to a negative one since 
2004.  
These trends confirm that the evolution of the neighbouring countries may be different from the 
other emerging market economies, which on the contrary, suffered the contraction of external 
capital flows during the same period. In this perspective the favourable expectations of the 
international lenders to the Baltic region, and Russia in particular, differ from the relative 
contraction of external financing (in particular bank loans) affecting the Southern Mediterranean 
region. These convergence patterns were interrupted by the financial crisis of the summer 2008. In 
fact, the net creditor position in 2008 in the three regions (Baltic, Caspian and Black sea) is 
essentially due to the contraction of portfolio liabilities of Russia.  
Instead, for the EU economies the imbalances increased, with a positive net position for the Baltic 
region (net position of Germany) and a deterioration of the Black Sea region (Greece) and 
Mediterranean Region (Spain).  
Which are the largest creditors and debtors, relative to their GDP levels? Even though richer 
countries tend to be creditors (Germany, with a net position of 25% of GDP in 2007 - 7% in 2001 
and France, with a net creditor position of 10% of GDP), the correlation is less evident. Russia has 
been net creditor before 2004 and becomes net creditor again in 2008. Syria, Iran and Libya are 
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creditor with net foreign credits higher than 30% of GDP (230% for Libya). In the Caspian region 
the foreign assets accumulated by the governments during the decade of high oil and gas prices now 
exceed the total foreign debt and inward FDI in countries like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, with an average net external position higher than 30%. Iran too, has a net positive 
position.  
Several neighbouring countries have successfully build up foreign assets and funds that help 
mitigate the impact of the economic setback in the industrial countries, but the longer-term goal of 
economic diversification remain elusive. This is partly because these countries in the Mediterranean 
and Caspian basin are dependent on wealth from natural resources and they lack of the sound 
institutional framework that would support the creation of a more diversified economy. 
France become net debtor in 2008, with a remarkable contraction of the value of FDI. The EU 
largest net debtors are Spain, with a NEP index higher than 80% (from a 24% in 2000), Greece 
(more than 100%) and Italy (21%). Indeed, in addition to the level of development (measured by the 
GNI), several other factors—including demographics, the size of public debt and FDI, and natural 
resources—influence significantly the net external position of the four basin. 
From the perspective of private capital flows the asymmetries between EU and non EU have 
increased, with a negative net external position higher than 35% of GDP in all regions and with 
only five capital exporting EU countries (Denmark, Germany and Sweden) in the Baltic Sea, Italy 
and France in the Mediterranean Sea. Among the neighbouring countries only Libya is a net 
investor (Portfolio Investments). For the non-EU Mediterranean countries and Baltic region, the 
downward trend in their external position was reversed in 2008, primary because of a deterioration 
of Russian Federation (contraction of inward FDI)  and the stability of the Caspian ad Black sea. 
For the Baltic the improvement in 2008 is due to the contraction of foreign investments in the same 
year.  
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The comparative look for the net debt position (debt assets less debt liabilities) shows the common 
convergence to lower level of external exposure, around 10% of GDP, while in 2000 the non EU 
Mediterranean countries were exposed by more than 30% of their GDP. Here, the shift from 
indebtedness to FDI has been made possible by the instruments of the first pillar of the 
euromediterranean partnership within the Barcelona Process. Instead, the financial integration 
within the EU has encouraged a credit boom and over-borrowing which have increased the 
unbalances in the Black sea basin (Greece in particular and Romania), the Mediterranean (again 
Greece and Spain), in contrast with the Baltic Sea basin that is near the balance or in net creditor 
position. 
 
Figure 3: Net External Position Index 
a) Gross capital flows 
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b) Gross Portfolio Equity and Foreign Direct Investment 
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c) Gross Other Investment (Portfolio Securities Debt and Other Investment) 
Net  Other FA / GDP - non EU
-40,0
-30,0
-20,0
-10,0
0,0
10,0
20,0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Baltic Non EU
M editerranean 
Non EU
Caspian Non EU
Black Non EU
Euro Area
 
Net  Other FA / GDP - EU
-70,0
-60,0
-50,0
-40,0
-30,0
-20,0
-10,0
0,0
10,0
20,0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Baltic EU
M editerranean EU
Black EU
Euro Area
 
 
3.5 Opportunities and risks for neighbouring countries 
The large increase in cross-border equity and direct investment holdings and the shifting patterns in 
international borrowing and lending in the non EU partners can be viewed positively, as factors 
reducing the vulnerability of the neighbouring markets to external shocks. Equity liabilities 
(including FDI) now account for about 40% of total external liabilities as a whole, compared to 
20% of EU countries. Only the non EU Mediterranean countries, while showing a gradual growth 
of private capital inflows, remained below 33%, offsetting the difference with a greater share of 
financial loans.  
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Financial integration also relates to the foreign assets and here we see an important systemic 
innovation, the growth of the outward FDI, which were enhanced by the removal of legal 
restrictions and the increased integration of the economies. The basins concerned are those of the 
Baltic and Black Sea, which are interconnected by the foreign investment activities of the Russian 
firms. The critical aspect in these financial relations is the lack of dynamism of the Mediterranean 
countries, with a share of direct investment of less than 10% of their foreign assets 
Consequently, all neighbouring economies have dramatically reduced the share of debt to their 
external liabilities to level well below the EU average, thus clearly reducing the risks of financial 
crises by linking more closely the return on external liabilities to domestic economic performance. 
However, as can be seen in figures 4, the financial crisis of 2008 as reversed the good performance 
of the previous years. 
 
Figure 4: Share of FDI and Indebtedness  
a) Share of Other Foreign Investment over total Foreign liabilities 
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b) Share of outward FDI over total Foreign Assets 
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c) Share of inward FDI over total Foreign Liabilities 
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3.6 Stock market capitalization 
In terms of their stock market capitalization, The Mediterranean and Baltic Sea Regions are in a 
better position. Particularly, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Croatia, in the Mediterranean basin and 
Russian Federation in the North show a clear upward trend between 2003 and 2007 (Figure 5).  
Nevertheless, the stock market capitalization still remains considerably below the relevant quotients 
of developed economies in Tunisia, Algeria, Turkey, Syria, Belarus and in the Caspian basin. 
Because the stock market is of relevance in financing enterprises, further efforts especially to attract 
foreign investors can be very important.  
Figure 5: Stock Market Capitalization in the 4 Seas 2000-2008, in percent of GDP 
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3.7 Reserves 
Finally, international reserves that are the liquid external assets under the control of the central 
bank. Here we notice a great asymmetry between the EU and the non EU regions. Not only the 
reserves-GDP ratios are ten time larger in non EU countries but the ratios increased substantially 
during the decade, 30% of GDP in the Mediterranean basis and 35% in the Baltic region (Russia in 
particular). 
In a period of greater flexibility of the exchange rates it is debatable this huge accumulation of 
reserves in line with the predictions of the buffer stock model (Adjustment costs, volatility of 
foreign trade, exposure volatile short-term inflows of capital)16. 
These reserves have a cost, a “social cost”, that Rodrik (2006)17 estimated trough the spread 
between the private sector’s cost of short-term borrowing abroad and the yield that the Central Bank 
earns on its liquid foreign assets. The estimated spread is 3 to 7 percent, a spread undoubtly very 
high especially for capital scarce economies. Therefore, it can be suggested that the central bank 
either curtail the size of reserves accumulation or invest the excess reserves for more profitable 
returns in term of employment (Mediterranean basin) and growth (Baltic basin). 
                                                            
16 CALVO, G. (1998);  EDWARDS, S. (2004). 
17 RODRIK, Dani, (2006). 
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Figure : Stock of International Reserves in the 4 Seas 2000-2008, in percent of GDP 
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4. Conclusions 
The experience of the South Mediterranean countries suggest that, despite the improvements in the 
FDI inflows and in deeper financial integration to some countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, 
Jordan) its sectoral destination does not always correspond to the real needs of the recipient 
economies. Excluding privatizations and investments in oil and gas concessions, foreign promoters 
invested only 1% of GPD, and the results were disappointing when confronted with the “ritual” 
declarations to stimulate local production capacity and to create additional employment and 
revenue.  
Therefore the essential policy issue is not simply to deepen the financial integration of the 
neighbouring counties into the global market, but how to build competitive and dynamic sectors and 
to improve the composition of the exports along the competitive advantages that require continuous 
investment, especially in skills and information.  
Despite these weaknesses, foreign investors could increase the chances of domestic enterprises to 
realize trade and investment opportunities through partnership, networking and exchange of 
information on best practices. 
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For understanding the factors behind the financial integration and the necessary policy measures, 
one needs to look at the role of the various institutions in the financial markets, not only in the 
markets for goods and services, which are the main interest of the FTA project.  
Financial cooperation, rather than financial integration, is still seen as a tool for targeted assistance 
to partner countries and the financial resources allocated the EU supported financial Institutions are 
still marginal compared to the financial flows of interest to the partner countries. In three basins the 
financial cooperation is assisted and promoted by regional Financial Institutions supported by EU 
member states: FEMIP in the Mediterranean, the IEB, the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank, 
the Nordic Investment Bank. It is obvious that the institutionalization of financial cooperation is in 
itself an incentive, but at the same time is not the sole condition for the success of economic 
integration with the neighbouring countries. 
Financial integration need the presence of foreign banks which are expected to strengthen the 
economic relationships among the EU and the partner countries or among the partner countries. 
Financial integration need also a more open attitude from the central authorities, which include also 
the reconsideration of the exchange rate regime, since recent experience shows that countries that 
anchored their currencies to the Euro at the end they get  better results in term of growth and 
stability. 
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